This paper provides evidence on the coordination to partial cartels in the presence of payo asymmetries. Firms face a coordination challenge when a partial cartel is to be formed as every rm is better o if it is not inside the cartel but is a free-riding outsider. We introduce a two-stage mechanism with communication which facilitates the formation of a cartel and respectively allows the formation of a partial cartel.
Introduction
The emergence of partial cartels remains a highly debated phenomenon in the theory of collusion which, in spite of numerous contributions to the subject, still leaves a host of questions unanswered. The cartel stability literature provides important insight on the market conditions which are necessary for a partial cartel to emerge, but deliberately leaves the subject of coordination challenges within the partial cartel untouched. Evidence from antitrust cases such as the vitamin C cartel, the district heating pipe cartel or the sugar institute cartel suggests that cartel members had to coordinate their behavior in order to confront the disruptive eect of those rms operating outside the cartel.
1 The failure to adequately coordinate actions among the cartel members, in order to respond to the competitive pressure of the outside rm, may ultimately lead to the breakdown of the collusive agreement. This phenomenon has been observed in the vitamin C cartel and the heating pipe cartel.
A signicant coordination challenge for a partial cartel may be generated by the fact that outside rms make excessive prots at the expense of the cartel members. As d 'Aspremont et al. (1983) underline ...however by free-riding, fringe rms enjoy higher prots than cartel members. In fact when rms in our setup decide to say no to the cartel, this does not imply a renunciation at all for them. This raises the following research question: Under which conditions do rms coordinate the formation of a partial cartel when a rm would be better o if it was the free-riding outsider? We tackle this problem as we provide a stylized experiment to investigate the conditions on how rms coordinate the formation of a partial cartel. More precisely, we study a mechanism that facilitates the formation of a stable partial cartel with and without communication.
This paper departs from the cartel formation approach where a unanimous decision to communicate constitutes cartel formation.
2 Instead we analyze a cartel with an institutional structure as in Selten (1973) which adequately copes with the coordination challenge in the cartel formation process. Furthermore we allow rms to employ free-form communication as further coordination device (see Harrington et al., 2013). 3 We therefore use a modied version of a threestage mechanism rst experimentally introduced by Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl (2009) (henceforth KOR, 2009 ) which works as follows: the formation process is split into two stages, where only those rms that attempt to establish a cartel in a rst stage are allowed to form it in the second stage. Firms observe the number of potential cartel members and thus the cartel size in the second stage before they unanimously decide to form the cartel. Finally, all cartel members are 1 In the vitamin C cartel, cartel members decided to purchase the excess supply of non-cartel members, in order to ensure that the quotas xed by the cartel would be fullled. The heating pipe cartel opted for a collective boycott against the customers and suppliers of the outside-rm Powerpipe in order to drive it out of the market (both cases see Harrington, 2006 and Harrington and Skrzypacz, 2011) . A similar strategy was observed in the sugar institute cartel case, where sugar reners from Florida suggested that the cartel should either force the outside rm Hershey to stop its unethical behavior or convince it to join the cartel (see Genesove and Mullin, 1999). 2 See, for instance, Apesteguia et al. (2007) , Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Bigoni et al. (2012) . This literature is discussed comprehensively, in the next section.
3 The study of Harrington et al. (2013) experimentally infers what modes of communication (non-binding price announcements vs. unrestricted written communication) are able to generate and sustain collusion. automatically bound to a certain quantity decision while the outsiders play the best-response strategy. By contrast, if the cartel is not formed, all rms play their competitive best-response strategies.
Most importantly, as we are interested in the interaction of communication (as a coordination device) and the two-stage mechanism, we introduce an innovation to the KOR (2009) framework by allowing the rms to communicate before the mechanism starts. In our view, a communication option in the beginning of the game adequately reects meetings of rms in a smoked-lled room. The introduction of communication is crucial in the context of cartels (e.g., McCutcheon, 1997; Genesove and Mullin, 2001; Andersson and Wengström, 2007, and Harrington et al., 2013) 4 and may furthermore reveal what motives drive the rms' decisions in the presence of prot asymmetries between cartel insiders and outsiders. Although rms are not bound to a contract after the communication stage, it adds an interesting new feature. That is, when rms tried to free-ride in previous periods, former inside rms may use the chat to inform former freeriders that they would stop to collude when this might be abused. Therefore communication in our framework cannot be seen as cheap talk and should crucially impact on rms' decisions in the subsequent two stages. The combination of an institutional structure provided by the KOR (2009) mechanism and communication not only allows us to answer our research question but also reects practices observed in cartel cases. As Genesove and Mullin (2001) point out:
Studying the Sugar Institute refocuses our attention on detection, in revealing how rms may enhance it by altering their environment through both specic rules and institutional structure, including communication.
The two-stage mechanism not only provides a clear partition between insiders and outsiders in the rst stage, it furthermore allows potential participants to check which rms are inside and outside of the cartel, before its formation. Undesirable constellations may thus be rejected in the second stage. Making the agreement binding is a simplication of the cartel implementation challenge as it guarantees the cartel's stability and ensures that it will not be jeopardized by cheaters within the cartel. This approach provides assurance of the prots insiders and outsiders will make and generates the prot asymmetry which is the subject of the research question at stake. Combining the communication opportunity with the mechanism will thus lead to interesting insights whether chat aects rms willingness to form cartels under the mechanism.
Furthermore it enables us to study whether potential cartel members honor partial cartels with outside rms. We are among the rst to provide experimental evidence on the formation of a partial cartel.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 links our approach to the relevant literature and presents our experimental design. Section 3 presents the theoretical predictions and the hypotheses we postulate. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the results, while Section 6 concludes.
4 Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) report the coordination enhancing eect of communication in a hold-up experiment.
2 Literature and Experimental Design 2.1 Related Literature
The predominant experimental literature on endogenous cartels mainly focuses on the disruptive eect of antitrust policies on the implementation of all-inclusive cartels. Apesteguia et al. (2007) , Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Bigoni et al. (2012) therefore leave out the endogenous cartel formation process and focus on the coordination of prices and the subsequent implementation of the cartel strategy. As opposed to the approach followed in this literature, we do not study antitrust policies in this paper, instead we analyze the conditions under which partial cartels may occur. Therefore, we tackle the cartel formation challenge and abstract from the cartel implementation challenge. We introduce a multi-stage mechanism that allows the rms to assess if the critical mass of rms willing to participate in a cartel is reached before the cartel is implemented.
This guarantees the emergence of stable cartels and allows us to infer how rms coordinate the formation of a partial cartel with and without preceding communication opportunity.
The theoretical literature on cartel stability determines the necessary market conditions that guarantee the emergence of stable cartels and their respective subsets of partial cartels. Accordingly the existence of partial cartels is established in a static setting for price-leadership (e.g., d 'Aspremont et al., 1983; Donsimoni, 1985; d'Aspremont and Gabszewicz, 1986; Donsimoni et al., 1986) , for quantity-leadership (e.g., Shaer, 1995) and in a dynamic capacity-constrained price game (e.g., Bos and Harrington, 2010) . Most of the papers, however, focus on the structure of the cartel, neglecting the coordination challenge rms face in the formation of these cartels.
A notable exception in this strand of literature is Selten (1973) who introduces institutional assumptions on the operation of a cartel characterized by a multi-stage coordination mechanism.
At the rst stage of this setup rms decide on the formation of a cartel. Afterwards, they bargain over the cartel's implementation via a quota scheme at the second stage.
5 The coordination challenge is therefore composed of a formation and a bargaining challenge since the cartel bargaining problem can only be solved and subsequently implemented if a sucient number of rms decide to form the cartel beforehand. Selten (1973) infers the impact of market size on the stability of the collusive agreement, focusing on the bargaining solution which allows the implementation of the cartel. Our paper diers in this aspect as it abstracts from this implementation challenge.
Instead it focuses on the formation challenge, analyzing how payo asymmetries and the subsequent free-rider problem generated in partial cartels impact on coordination. Here, an experimental analysis on the formation of an endogenous institution which sanctions 5 In Selten (1973) , the solution of the cartel bargaining stage implies that rms will stick to the agreement and not cheat on the cartel. Hence the successful coordination of the quotas guarantees that the cartel is implemented afterwards.
6 Note that the theoretical model implemented experimentally in KOR (2009) developed in Okada (1993) is closely related to Selten (1973) . As Okada (1993) underlines: The prototype of our institutional arrangement can be found in Selten (1973) Cournot quantity for all its members, whereas the outsiders always play best-response. Hence we assume that the cartel may be able to prevent cartel members from cheating. Here, one might raise the objection that joint prot maximization does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint of a rm that wants to maximize its own prot. However, evidence from several cartel cases as presented in Levenstein and Suslow (2006) conrm the theoretical nding revealed by Bernheim and Whinston (1985) which shows that a joint-prot maximizing strategy may be sustained in a cartel. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) group the problems cartels have to overcome in three categories:
coordination of the behavior to a collusive agreement, cheating on the collusive agreement and market entry. As our research focuses on the rst category, namely coordination, our analysis abstracts from the second and third categories. On the one hand this approach therefore introduces a technical simplication of the cartelization challenge. Our framework guarantees after the two stags that the potential payo asymmetries generated by outside rms are not jeopardized by cartel members that decide to cheat on the cartel agreement. Hence the eect of cheating within the cartel is neglected in our framework. On the other hand the eect of cheating may be neglectable in the context of explicit collusion as empirical evidence provided by Levenstein and Suslow (2006) suggests.
7 Furthermore, Bernheim and Whinston (1985) show that the implementation of a joint-sales agency incentivizes competing rms through an indirect mechanism to opt for the joint-prot-maximizing output. Experimental evidence by Cooper and Kühn (2014) highlights that the implementation of an eective retaliation mechanism that punishes cheating eciently induces full cooperation in an innitely repeated coordination game.
Hence our setup does not literally require enforceable cartel contracts or a binding agreement to guarantee that cartel members maximize joint prots.
As the coordination of the cartel formation process in our experiment is composed of a twostage mechanism with a preceding communication phase, we contribute to the literature on the pro-collusive eect of communication. Economic theory by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Farrell and Rabin (1996) underlines that coordination may be facilitated by communication, which is furthermore experimentally conrmed (e.g., Cooper et al., 1989; Cooper et al., 1992; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) . Recent papers in the experimental antitrust literature by Andersson 7 Note however that Levenstein and Suslow (2006) nd that market entry is one of the biggest challenges cartels face.
and Wengström (2007), Fonseca and Normann (2012) , and Cooper and Kühn (2014) , who thoroughly analyze the impact of communication on cartelization, conrm its pro-collusive eect.
We contribute to this literature as we analyze how communication impacts on the formation of partial cartels. The communication device is of particular importance here, as it may allow us to study whether rms actively use it to enforce collusion by threatening potential free riders for being not cooperative in future periods. The latter indeed leads to the fact that communication in our game is not cheap talk as we apply a repeated game where rms meet for ten periods.
Firms may therefore punish rms lying in the chat.
8 The communication option also allows us to to understand the underlying motivations of colluding rms, i.e., whether rms may care about payo asymmetries between inside/outside rms in partial cartels. We therefore evaluate communication following the approaches used in Andersson and Wengström (2007) and Kimbrough et al. (2008) in order to infer whether or not payo asymmetries inuence the formation of partial cartels.
Experimental Design
In our experiments we implemented four dierent treatments: Standard Endogenous Cartels with Chat (SECC), Standard Endogenous Cartels (SEC), Modied Endogenous Cartels with Chat all-inclusive cartel. Our main focus are the treatments with modied payos, i.e., in the MECC treatment we introduce a crucial modication of the payo structure for a partial cartel in the standard treatment. The latter facilitates the emergence of a partial cartel (see next section for a detailed theoretical description of the game). Again we introduce a treatment MEC without chat,
Recall that rms may threaten other rms to stop collusion when they realize that these rms try to abuse the cooperation.
which allows us to evaluate the role of communication on the coordination and implementation of a stable partial cartel. The treatments with standard payos provide useful benchmark cases to infer the eects of potential payo asymmetries in the presence of partial cartels (we will discuss this below, when we introduce the payo schemes of our treatments). The reason is that theory predicts partial cartels to occur in MECC and MEC, whereas all-inclusive cartels are predicted in SECC and SEC.
9 Therefore the benchmark treatments enable us to compare how rms coordinate the formation of a stable all-inclusive cartel and a stable partial cartel.
Thus we can infer whether rms form partial cartels and whether this leads to a coordination challenge. The variation of chat/no chat and modied/standard payos allows us to study the research question, i.e, under which conditions may rms coordinate to partial cartels. Table   2 provides an overview of the payos generated in a symmetric Cournot game with four rms for every cartel constellation.
10 In the table, cartel members' payos are determined following the assumption that they maximize the joint prots. Furthermore, we assume that the outsiders play their best-response strategies which determines their payos. In the following we explain our mechanism. Note: The table illustrates subjects' payo dependent on their role (insider/outsider) and the total sum of insiders/outsiders. It also depicts how the combination of chat and the modied mechanism works. Payos are presented in Taler which is a synonym for ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). The payos were rounded to integers, and we always assume the subjects to play their best-responses.
In stage zero of SECC and MECC rms of one market were given the possibility to participate in an unrestricted chat. This took place in a chat window for a total of 60 seconds. After that the window automatically closed and stage one started immediately.
11
In stage one all subjects in a market simultaneously had to state whether they wanted to join a cartel.
12 Subjects simply had to click on a yes-or no-button. If a participant stated in stage one that she was willing to form a cartel she became a possible insider.
Participants who stated in stage one that they did not want to form a cartel became ultimate outsiders.
In stage two everybody was informed of the total number of possible insiders and ultimate outsiders. Note that both types of subjects (possible insiders as well as ultimate outsiders) were given information on the total number of participants willing to establish a cartel. In stage two, only possible insiders were allowed to decide whether they denitely wanted to form a cartel. Beforehand, they were asked if they ultimately wanted to stick to the cartel. The possible payo of being a cartel member was presented to them as well as the possible payo of being an outsider. Additional information about the resulting payos of the ultimate outsiders was also given. Once again, possible insiders either had to click the yes-or no-button to state whether they ultimately wanted to join the cartel. If one of these subjects clicked the no-button, the agreement was rejected and no cartel was established. The cartel agreement became binding if and only if all possible insiders in stage two selected the yes-button to conrm that they ultimately wanted to join the cartel.
13 Otherwise they became direct competitors and received the Cournot Nash equilibrium prots of a standard four-rm Cournot market. Ultimate outsiders did not have to make any choice in stage two and were only informed of the number of possible insiders.
Finally subjects' payos were automatically determined (stage 3). Every subject was informed of whether a cartel had been formed or not. Additionally, they obtained information about their own payos and those of the other participants which resulted from the occurrence or non-occurrence of the cartel. Figure 1 gives an overview of the mechanism's stages. We used a xed matching protocol where every group interacted for 10 periods, i.e., the two-stage game was repeated for 10 periods.
14 For the SECC treatment we generated data of three matching groups and for the MECC treatment we generated data of four matching 12 The treatments were neutrally framed using the German word Marktabsprache which means market agreement.
13 Note, if unanimity had not been required the rms would have again faced a coordination problem within the cartel in stage two. Hence, for the sake of operability we implemented unanimity.
14 We opt for xed matching as this replicates a real market with recurrent interaction.
groups. In the SEC and MEC treatment we each have data of seven match groups. were programed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and our subjects were recruited with the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) .
3 Theoretical predicitions and hypotheses
Underlying theory: the Cournot game
We consider a symmetric Cournot market where n = 4 rms sell a homogeneous product. The linear demand function for the product corresponds to P ( 
whereas the outsiders' prots are given by:
A complete overview of the standard Cournot payos depending on the cartel outcomes is provided in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 (see Experimental-Design section).
The cartel-stability conditions outlined in d 'Aspremont et al. (1983) state that all cartel members must prefer to be inside the cartel (internal stability) while outside rms must always prefer to be outside the cartel (external stability) in equilibrium. Absent of our mechanism we never observe a stable cartel as the internal stability criteria given by (40)
15 Note, we conducted more data in our treatments without communication as we observed more heterogeneity in these treatments.
16 Note that this strategy induces the outside rm to be very aggressive, as every outside rm will have exactly the same market share as the cartel.
holds for no value m > 1.
Our mechanism copes with the cartel stability issues that may jeopardize the formation of a stable cartel. As the mechanism automatically binds the cartel members to the joint maximizing strategy, possible cartel insiders at the second stage decide to form the cartel if and only if the cartel payos exceed the competition payos without a cartel. Therefore the internal-stability criteria in our mechanism corresponds to (40)
Hence, internal cartel stability is guaranteed if and only if m = 4.
17
In the rst stage rms decide to be either a possible insider or an ultimate outsider.
As the m = 4 rms cartel is the only stable cartel, free-riding on the cartel always fails. There is no second stage equilibrium with outside rms, so that the m = 4 cartel is also externally stable. Hence all rms announce their willingness to join the cartel in the rst stage, where a cartel with m = 4 rms is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Proposition 1 states our result:
Proposition 1: With standard Cournot payos, the cartel with m = 4 members is a strict subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As four-rm cartels will always be implemented at the second stage, all rms decide to be insiders of the cartel at the rst stage.
We now turn to the analysis of the case with the modied payos for a three-rm cartel.
The payos are outlined in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 (see Experimental-Design section).
The modication of rms' payos changes the outcome of the game as follows: given our mechanism, the potential cartel members implement the cartel at the second stage if the following condition is satised:
Now, this not only holds for m = 4 but also for m = 3 as the insiders' payos correspond to 70.
18
At the rst stage, a rm may increase its payos from 100 to 178 if it becomes an ultimate outsider. The cartel with m = 3 is internally stable, as no rm will revoke its decision to participate in the cartel with three rms. It is externally stable, as the outside rm would reduce its payos if it announced its willingness to join the cartel at the rst stage instead. This is not the case for the all-inclusive cartel with four rms, as one rm would be better o by becoming an ultimate outsider at the rst stage. We thus formulate the following proposition:
17 Note that Equations four and ve are the essence of Salant et al. (1983). 18 Note that the m = 3 cartel is also externally stable, i.e., no outside rm will rather be inside the cartel than outside the cartel as 178 > 100.
Proposition 2: In the case of modied Cournot payos we obtain four strict subgame-perfect equilibria yielding stable cartels each with m = 3 cartel members and every rm as the only outsider in each of the equilibra.
Proposition 2 highlights that in the modied version of the game another interesting coordination challenge occurs, i.e., rms have to coordinate on which rm should be the unique outsider.
19 Thus, we also obtain a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where rms opt for the possible insider position with a probability of p = 3 16 as the decision is simultaneous at the rst stage. Given this result the emergence of a three-rm cartel is observed with a probability of p = 0.214, while a four-rm cartel emerges with a probability of p = 0.0012. However, it suces for our purposes to focus on a partial cartel encompassing three rms. Note that our theoretical predictions are outlined for a static framework although our experimental treatments are repeated for 10 periods. As we do not obtain multiple equilibria, we do not expect the nite repetition of the game to yield diverging results. Nonetheless, our result section includes a learning section in order to infer whether the nite repetition of the game may inuence the obtained results.
Hypotheses
Given the theoretical predictions in the previous subsection we derive our hypotheses.
Propositions 1 and 2, predict that the mechanism always yields cartels. Proposition 1 states that the four-rm cartel is the only cartel, i.e., only all-inclusive cartels will be formed in SECC. Proposition 2 predicts that in the case of modied Cournot payos only the cartel composition with m = 3 cartel members and one outside rm is stable. Thus, only partial cartels will occur with modied payos. Following this line of reasoning we expect signicantly more partial cartels in MECC than in SECC. From a theoretical point of view there is no dierence between the communication and the no-communication case.
This leads to Hypotheses 1a and 1b.
Hypothesis 1 (a) In MECC, signicantly more partial cartels will be established than in SECC.
(b) In MEC, signicantly more partial cartels will be established than in SEC.
Our main research question targets on the acceptance of partial cartels in the presence of asymmetric payos. Therefore we focus on MECC and MEC and study how communication in the case of partial cartels inuences the decision to form the collusive agreement.
The notion of Proposition 2 also implies that partial cartels encompassing three rms will always be accepted by inside rms at the second stage of the mechanism. Theory again 19 In this regard the experiment can give interesting insights how rms will cope with that.
predicts no dierence for the case with and without communication. We can therefore formulate Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Hypothesis 2 (a) In MECC, rms intending to form a cartel will always accept partial cartels with threee members.
(b) In MEC, rms intending to form a cartel will always accept partial cartels with threee members.
Results
In the following paragraphs the hypotheses are tested. Therefore we start reporting the frequency of established cartels. Afterwards we study the determinants of cartel formation, i.e, the incentives to attempt cartels in the dierent Treatments.
In a next step we analyze rms' willingness to accept partial cartels in the presence of payo asymmetries. Finally, we investigate rms' learning behavior. The data includes one MECC group which decided to play a taking-turns strategy 20 coordinating the formation of a three-rm cartel which encompassed the outside rm in its collusive agreement. As this decision constitutes a collusive agreement the group is also treated as a four-rm cartel.
21
The non-parametric tests are always conducted at the match group level of the treatments.
Frequency of established cartels
To test Hypothesis 1a and 1b the analysis starts with a summary statistic reporting the frequency of established cartels in the Treatments. Table 3 gives an overview of the average frequency of established cartel compositions over all periods in the four treatments. It presents data of four (MECC), three (SECC), and seven (MEC and SEC) independent observations of the match-group level in the treatments.
20 Although playing taking-turns strategies does lower total rm prots (see footnote 19), the observation of rms applying this strategy once ore emphasizes the coordination challenge determined by Proposition 2. Similar taking-turns strategies have been observed in Fonseca and Normann (2012) .
21 The chat protocol revealed that this group played the taking-turns strategy between periods 4 and 7.
Hence, the four-rm data comprises this group's choices of periods 4-7. Note that when rms play this taking-turns strategy their joint prots are 388, while coordination to the all-inclusive cartel yields joint prots of 400. dierence between partial and all-inclusive cartels in MEC. In the standard treatment without chat rms form signicantly more all-inclusive cartels than partial cartels.
Finally, the data shows that the communication option has a pro-collusive eect, i. Note: Two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests were used to test for signicant dierences. In this Figure ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Tests were applied at the match-group level. For the tests we had three match groups in MEC and SEC where cartels were formed.
The analysis has shown that the communication option leads to dierent outcomes as compared to the case without chat. We nd that in SECC and MECC signicantly more cartels are established. Supporting theory we nd that communication has (almost) no eect on established cartel compositions when comparing SEC and SECC (see Figure   2 ). In contrast to theoretical predictions this is not the case for the modied treatments, here, communication leads to exclusively all-inclusive cartels. Whereas, partial cartels can be found in the absence of chat. We can therefore establish our rst result regarding established cartels:
Result 1 (Established Cartels) 
Stage-1 Results: Attempted Cartels
The previous section revealed that no partial cartel was formed in the treatments with communication. Furthermore, we only nd few partial cartels in MEC and the total fraction of cartels was small. To get a better understanding on rm coordination to partial and all-inclusive cartels we now infer the incentives to form a cartel in our treatments.
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We do not observe a statistical signicant dierence between SEC and MEC. be exciting to analyze how rms react to payo asymmetries when partial cartels with three rms can be formed. Table 4 reports the implementation and rejection rates of cartel compositions conditioned on the number of possible insiders. Note: The table gives an overview of the implementation and rejection rates of cartels conditioned on the number of possible insiders at stage 2. Possible insiders are rms who stated their willingness to form a cartel at stage 1.
In what follows we conduct one-sample t-tests to test for statistical signicance of acceptance and rejection rates. The tests are based on the match-group levels. Table 4 shows that in MECC and SECC rms always implement the four-rm cartel. At the same time partial cartels with three members are always rejected in the communication treatments.
The nding is striking as the three-rm cartel is an equilibrium in MECC. We therefore have to reject Hypothesis 2a, i.e., rms in MECC do never accept partial cartels with three members. It is remarkable that possible insiders here renounce to earn 70 when rejecting the three-rm cartel.
Focusing on the modied case without communication, we nd the same phenomenon,
i.e., only 44% of the partial cartels are accepted. A one sample t-test rejects the hypothesis that the rejection rate (56%) of three-rm cartels is zero (t(6)=2.914, p = 0.027).
The nding that rms in MEC reject 56% of the three-rm cartels is striking as theory predicts that these cartels will be accepted. We therefore have to reject Hypothesis 2b. Furthermore rms in MEC reject the vast majority (95%) of two-rm cartels.
27 By contrast, MEC rms accept 83% of the all-inclusive cartels.
28 The result that two-rm cartels are almost always rejected is obviously the consequence of coordination failures of rms at the rst stage. That is, cartels in MEC are never ecient when less than three rms attempt to form a cartel. Therefore, rational rm behavior would suggest that these cartels are not implemented at the second stage. However, rms not implementing the three-rm cartel in MEC and MECC cannot only be explained by coordination failures at stage 1, i.e, Proposition 2 predicts the three-rm cartel to be stable. The reason is, that inside rms implementing the three-rm cartel would be better o as opposed to the case when cartels are rejected.
In SEC, rms again always reject all constellations with less than four rms. There is only one exception in SEC where the three-rm cartel composition is accepted.
29
The majority of all-inclusive cartels (68%) is implemented in SEC.
30
The fact that we have found substantial rejections of three-rm cartels in MEC and MECC might be explained by fairness models like Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . Here it may be argued that inside rms dislike payo asymmetries where one outside rm would get 178 Taler, while the insiders get 70 Taler each. Thus our results contribute to Armstrong and Huck (2010) who summarize the behavioral economics literature in the IO context.
The authors highlight in their article that many people are strongly sensitive to relative pay which is also documented in the happiness literature (Clark et al., 2008) . Moreover, Armstrong and Huck (2010) point out that CEOs may also care about relative payos as 27 A one sample t-test, testing whether this fraction is larger than 50% cannot be rejected (t(6)=-9.500, p = 1.000).
28 A one-sample t-test, testing whether this fraction is larger than 50% cannot be rejected (t(2)=2.000, p = 0.908). We therefore analyze whether rms strategically reject the formation of three-rm cartels in order to incentivize outsiders to attempt all-inclusive cartels in subsequent periods. Hence, this section infers whether the fraction of attempted all-inclusive cartels changes over time. Figure 2 depicts the development of the fraction of attempted full cartels. In MECC we observe a weak learning eect at the beginning: rms quickly anticipate to attempt the four-rm cartel after period 3. However, there is no signicant dierence when comparing the average attempted all-inclusive cartels in periods 1-5 (3.8)
to periods 6-10 (3.8)(one-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, p − value = 0.353). The main reason is that rms in MECC are prone to an end-game eect which starts in period 8. By contrast in MEC no learning can be found, i.e., on average 2.06 four-rm cartels are attempted between periods 1-5 compared to 2.03 in periods 6-10 (one-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, p − value = 0.316).
31 Huck et al. (2001) observe in an experimental Stackelberg setting that Stackelberg followers sanction Stackelberg leaders by increasing their quantities. Similarly Huck et al. (2007) show in a merger experiment based on Salant et al. (1983) , that merged rms prevent free-riding behavior of non-merging outside rms. The section emphasizes that in the beginning nearly all rms in SECC and MECC attempt to establish the four-rm cartel, whereas in MEC and SEC only few rms attempt it.
To learn more about the substantial treatment dierences between the non-communication
and chat treatments we therefore analyze the chat protocols in the subsequent section.
Analysis of the Chat Protocols
As opposed to Proposition 2 we nd no signicant dierence between the fraction of es- In this regard we rst follow an approach similar to Andersson and Wengström (2007) .
The authors account for the number of messages sent and the percentage of collusive agreements in the markets. A collusive agreement is dened as any case where subjects in their setting proposed a price by sending a message which was not rejected by other subjects. In our setting we account for a collusive agreement whenever rms proposed an agreement on the cartel and this was not rejected by other rms.
32 Table 7 depicts the average messages sent and the percentage of chat agreements . The table provides evidence that in both treatments most messages are sent in the rst period. On average subjects send more messages in MECC (14) than in SECC (9). In both treatments there is a strong decrease of messages sent after the rst period. Strikingly, this decrease is pronounced in SECC (33%) in contrast to MECC (15%). (2007), we dene a collusive agreement in a market whenever at least one subject proposed reaching a market agreement by sending a message and this was not rejected by any of the other subjects Focusing on collusive agreements it can be observed that in both treatments the implementation of the market agreement is discussed in period 1 of all markets. Starting with period 2 there is a sharp decrease of collusive agreements in SECC, whereas it remains constantly high in MECC. This emphasizes that the incentives of the modied-payo structure seem to trigger more discussions on cartel-formation strategies among rms than in SECC. To shed more light on these strategies we infer the contents of representative chat protocols. In this regard we follow Kimbrough et al. (2008) and Fonseca and Normann (2012) who have shown that quoting chat protocols of experiments may be very helpful for further revealing promising information about subjects' strategies.
We now give a representative rst period example, emphasizing how rms in Market 1 of SECC decided to reach a collusive agreement:
Market 1, period 1: SECC firm 2: does everybody take part ?! firm 1: yes, sure firm 3: absolutely firm 4: I recommend, that everybody always takes part. This will guarantee that everybody 32 As opposed to Andersson and Wengström (2007) the agreement to form a cartel in a chat does not constitute a collusive agreement per se. In their setup chat is costly, whereas it is free in our setup. In our framework although chat does not bind rms to the collusive strategies it cannot be seen as cheap-talk agreement. The reason is that our game is repeated and rms lying in the cheat can be easily punished by other rms in future periods. As already outlined in the previous sections, one of our MECC group (market 3) used the chat opportunity to agree to a taking-turns strategy starting from period 4.
We therefore present the chat protocol of this group to demonstrate how these rms coordinated:
Market 3, period 4: MECC firm 2: all of us should uniquely not take part firm 2: then everybody would get 178 once firm 2: who wants to be the first to do that? .. firm 1: I will not take part! 34 Although chat is costless in our experiment, it turns out that the combination of chat with the two-stage mechanism is an ecient instrument to reach collusive agreements. In MECC where a high frequency of non-decreasing collusive agreements can be found, it turns out that chat was an important instrument to sustain cooperation over time. This may explain why solely all-inclusive cartels emerged in contrast to MEC where most cartels were established as three-rm cartels.
Result 4 In both treatments rms in all markets immediately propose the market agreement. In MECC rms permanently use collusive agreements to stabilize long-term cooperation over time, whereas in SECC there is a sharp decrease of this behavior right after the rst period.
Discussion
Our paper is among the rst experiments to analyze the coordination challenge faced in the formation of a partial cartel. In this regard we study the interaction of communication and a two-stage mechanism to form cartels. Our results highlight the important role of high outsider payos and payo asymmetries when partial cartels are possible. The modied treatments without communication attract rms trying to be outsiders. We nd that the latter frequently leads to coordination failures, i.e., cases with less than three rms willing to form a cartel. Furthermore, payo asymmetries when three rms are willing to form the cartel seem to exacerbate the coordination to partial cartels. That is, potential cartel members prefer to revoke the decision to form the cartel if outsiders 34 Andersson and Wengström (2007) results regarding a pro-collusive eect of chat are conrmed (Fonseca and Normann, 2012; Cooper and Kühn, 2014) ,i.e, substantial more cartels are formed in MECC and SECC.
Furthermore the enhancing eect of communication also conrms the results of Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) who study a hold-up experiment. The high cartelization rates emphasize that rms use the chat option as coordination device to avoid that rms stay a away from cartels. Second, the ndings highlight that most cartels established with communication in MECC and SECC are all-inclusive cartels.
Although the paper points out that rms face a particular coordination challenge in the formation of a partial cartel, it does not question the emergence of partial cartels. It rather provides insight on the payo structures that may preclude the formation of partial cartels.
Put dierently, our framework models the outsider as an aggressive maverick which takes over a signicant market share after the emergence of the partial cartel. However, most of the partial cartels that have emerged in recent decades faced competition from outside rms operating at the fringe of the market (therefore also labeled as fringe rms). The respective fringe rms initially behaved non-aggressively and had a limited disruptive eect on the formation of a cartel. This behavior not only guaranteed the protability of the cartel for the insiders, but also mitigated the disruptive eect of excessive payo asymmetries we outlined here. Non-aggressive market behavior by competing fringe rms may therefore be a necessary condition for the emergence of a partial cartel.
So far this approach has abstracted from the analysis of antitrust policies, as our suggested research question necessitates a positive approach of the coordination challenge.
The normative approach analyzing the eciency of antitrust policies has to include cartel defection, which limits the applicability of our framework in this context. However, our experimental approach is not only limited to analyze the impact of payo asymmetries in the coordination process of a partial cartel. It may also infer coordination challenges resulting from antitrust policies. In this regard the results of the communication treatment emphasized the important role of chat to overcome the coordination problems rms face when attempting to form cartels. Discriminatory leniency policies, for instance, which preclude ne reductions for cartel ringleaders may generate payo-asymmetries within a cartel. Thus rms may be disincentivized to take a leading role in the formation of a cartel. A coordination challenge in the formation of cartels may therefore arise and may thus necessitate more theoretical and experimental evidence in this area.
